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Abstract 
 
The Japanese General Social Survey was used to determine how individual 
preferences for income redistribution are affected by family structure, such as the 
number of siblings and birth order where individuals grow up. After controlling for 
various individual characteristics, the important findings were as follows. (1) The 
first-born child was less likely to prefer income redistribution when the child was 
male. However, such a tendency was not observed when the child was female. (2) 
The larger the number of elder brothers, the more likely an individual preferred 
income redistribution. However, the number of elder sisters did not affect the 
preference. (3) The number of younger siblings did not affect a male’s preference 
for redistribution regardless of the sibling’s sex. The number of younger brothers 
did not affect a female’s preference, whereas the number of younger sisters was 
associated with females preferring income redistribution. These findings regarding 
the effect of birth order are not consistent with evidence provided by a study 
conducted in a European country (Fehr et al 2008). 
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1. Introduction  
 
The classical assumption of economics is that individuals aim to behave to 
increase their own utility. Furthermore, the formation of preference has not been 
considered in neo-classical economics. However, in modern economics, it is a major 
issue for economic researchers to determine how an individual’s preference is 
formed (Fehr, E., Schmidt 1999; Akerlof and Kranton 2000; Fernandez et al., 2004, 
Fehr et al., 2006, Kawaguchi and Miyazaki 2009). For example, examining the 
determinants of preference for redistribution is one of the major issues for 
analyzing preference formation (e.g., Ravallian and Lokshin, 2000; Corneo and and 
Gruüner, 2002; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Rainer and Seidler, 2008). People can 
learn from various experiences in a social relationship. Interactions among people 
have been found to affect the preference for redistribution (Yamamura, 2012). The 
circumstances where individuals grow up appear to play a critical role on 
formation of an individual’s preference. For example, parents play a critical role in 
the formation of an individuals’ preference (Fernandez et al.,2004, Kawaguchi and 
Miyazaki 2009)2.   
Besides the characteristics of parents, family structure, such as the number of 
siblings and birth order, possibly affect the formation of preference.3 As argued by 
Fehr et al. (2008), the relationship among siblings is the primary social 
relationship, and therefore, it affects the formation of preference. In an 
experimental analysis in Switzerland, Fehr et al (2008) showed that birth order 
and the presence of siblings affect the degree of children’s inequality aversion4. 
They found that children without siblings are more likely to share resources 
voluntarily and that the youngest child is less likely to share them. Based on these 
                                                   
2 The evidence provided based on data from the United States suggests that men who 
were raised by working mothers consider it natural for women to work outside the 
home (Fernandez et al.,2004). Kawaguchi and Miyazaki (2009) used data from Japan 
to test this argument and found that men raised by full-time working mothers are less 
likely to support traditional gender roles and are also less likely to believe in the 
negative effect of a mother working on her children’s development. 
3 It is widely acknowledged that family structure, such as birth order and the number 
of siblings, leads to different economic outcomes; for example, accumulation of human 
capital (e.g., Berman and Taubman, 1986; Kessler, 1991; Hanushek 1992; Oettinger 
2000; Black et al. 2005; Kantrevic and Mechoulan, 2006; Lee 2008; Dayiogru et al. 
2009; Dammert, 2010; Cho 2011), participation in the labor market (Edmonds, 2006), 
child mortality (Makepeace and Pal 2008; Chamarbagwala, 2011), and inequality 
(Mazumder 2008). 
4 Birth order and the number of siblings have an effect on an individual’s perception 
and values, such as positional concern (Lampi and Nordblom 2010). 
  
results, they argued that children with siblings tend to be altruistic, while the 
youngest child tends to be selfish5. However, a “consequence of constraints in 
capital and labor use is that parents must ration available funds and time to each 
of their children. Children thus become rivals” (Garg and Morduch 1998, 472). 
Competition naturally reduces the amount of resources for each child. Therefore, 
children with siblings become poorer than children without siblings if other 
variables are constant. In addition, “the relative genders and ages of siblings can 
be central in determining the outcomes of these rivalries” (Garg and Morduch 1998, 
472). Relationships among siblings appear to be vertical rather than horizontal 
because differences in ages between siblings naturally lead to elder siblings having 
physical and knowledge advantages over younger siblings. Furthermore, 
investment for education is thought to be larger for elder siblings (Black et al. 
2005; Kantrevic and Mechoulan, 2006). The youngest child appears to be in a 
disadvantageous position with regard to competition among siblings. Therefore, 
the youngest child inevitably becomes the poorest among siblings. Poorer people 
are thought to prefer income redistribution compared with richer people. This 
inference assuming that people are selfish is not in line with the argument of Fehr 
et al. (2008). Whether people are selfish or altruistic appears to depend on the 
features of society where people grow up. However, with the exception of Fehr et al. 
(2008), little is known about how the number of siblings and birth order influences 
an individual’s preference for redistribution. 
As argued by Fehr et al. (2008), “roots of human egalitarianism and 
parochialism do not preclude culture and socialization from playing an important 
part in other-regarding preference” (Fehr et al., 2008, 1082). Alesina et al. (2004) 
also argued that people’s perception regarding inequality differs according to social 
and cultural backgrounds. More recently, Benjamin et al. (2010) found that social 
identity leads to differences in the economic preference between Asian-Americans 
and other Americans. Compared with studies from Europe and the United States 
(e.g., Alesina et al., 2004; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Alesina and Giuliano, 
2009; Derin-Güre and Uler, 2010), existing studies have not fully assessed the 
determinants of Japanese people’s preference for redistribution, with the exception 
of Ohtake and Tomioka (2004) and Yamamura (2012). Therefore, it is necessary to 
examine how and the extent to which the preference for redistribution is affected 
by siblings in non-European countries whose cultural roots are different from 
                                                   
5 Alger and Weibull (2010) analyzed the strategic interaction between two mutually 
altruistic siblings.  
  
European countries. The current study attempted to examine the birth order and 
existence of siblings on preferences for redistribution using data from the Japanese 
General Social Survey (JGSS) of Japan, which includes more than 10,000 
observations. Using the JGSS allowed comparison of the effect of siblings on 
preference for redistribution between Japan and Europe6. Therefore, the findings 
of this study will help researchers to consider how social, historical, and cultural 
differences influence redistribution preferences. The most important findings of 
this study were as follows. (1) The first-born boy is less likely to prefer income 
redistribution. However, there is no such tendency for the first-born girl. (2) The 
larger the number of elder brothers, the more likely an individual prefers income 
redistribution. However, the number of elder sisters (number of younger brothers 
or sisters) does not affect the preference. These findings are not consistent with 
Fehr et al. (2008). Further, the presence of younger sisters results in females 
opposing redistribution, whereas the presence of younger sisters does not affect a 
male’s redistribution preference. On the other hand, the presence of younger 
brothers does not affect the preference for redistribution in males and females.  
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, the testable 
hypotheses are presented. Section 3 presents an explanation of data and the 
empirical method used. Section 4 provides the estimation results and their 
interpretation. The final section offers some conclusions. 
 
2. Hypotheses 
 
In the experiments conducted by Fehr et al (2008), it was found that children 
without siblings tend to share resources voluntarily and that the youngest child is 
less inclined to share resources. Fehr et al (2008) interpreted these findings as 
follows: (1) children with siblings “experienced more competition for scarce 
resources in their families, which could make them less generous and less willing 
to share resource voluntarily” (Fehr et al 2008, 19 in supplementary information) 
7; and (2) the youngest children “are least able to assert themselves during early 
childhood when siblings compete for resources. Therefore, they may have to grab a 
                                                   
6 Kawaguchi and Miyazaki (2009) used the JGSS to examine the value of the role of 
sex, making their results comparable with the study of Fernandez et al. (2004) using 
the General Social Survey (GSS) conducted in the United States. 
7 Supplementary information of Fehr et al. (2008), which is available at the website of 
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v454/n7208/suppinfo/nature07155.html 
(accessed on February 10, 2012). 
  
resource whenever it becomes available, rendering them less altruistic” (Fehr et al 
2008, 19-20 in supplementary information).  
Therefore, the presence of siblings causes people to be less altruistic. On the 
other hand, the youngest person is less inclined to be altruistic. In other words, the 
first-born person is more inclined to be altruistic. Furthermore, altruistic people 
are more likely to prefer income redistribution. Hypothesis 1 is proposed as 
follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  
  People with a larger number of siblings are less likely to prefer redistribution. 
Further, the first-born person among siblings is more likely to prefer 
redistribution.  
 
The parental resources per child decrease with the number of children 
(Cáceres-Delpiano 2006). From the viewpoint of standard economics, the smaller 
the number of siblings, the smaller the competitive pressure for an individual. In 
the case of a person without siblings, the situation is monopoly. Therefore, he/she 
can enjoy the profit resulting from monopoly. He/she is naturally richer than those 
who have siblings when other variables are constant. Accordingly, he/she does not 
support the policy to promote income redistribution if he/she is selfish. This is 
because the policy of income redistribution reduces his/her own net-revenue.  
Because of his/her seniority, the first person among siblings is thought to 
naturally have a great advantage against siblings regarded as his/her competitors 
(Garg and Morduch 1998). Consequently, the first-born person can obtain a larger 
revenue than other siblings. In other words, the first child is richer than other 
siblings within a family. Based on this assumption, allocation for the first-born 
child is reduced and allocation for younger children is increased if parents 
redistribute their resources equally to children. Therefore, younger children 
request that their parents redistribute allocation equally to reduce the inequality 
among children. Furthermore, an individuals’ utility appears to depend not only on 
their own income level, but also on the income level of surrounding people. A rise in 
the income of surrounding people leads people to be unhappy, while a rise in their 
own income leads people to be happy (Stutzer 2004; Luttmer 2005). If this is true, 
the lower the level an individual’s utility is, the higher the revenue for his/her 
other siblings is. Such an effect among siblings increases the utility of the 
first-born child. If the first child is selfish, he/she is less likely to support the 
  
“income redistribution policy” adopted by parents. In the case that such a 
preference of the first child persists after he/she becomes an adult, the first-born 
person does not prefer income redistribution. The role of a “benevolent” 
government is considered as equivalent to the role of parents when children 
become adults. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 was postulated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  
  People with a larger number of siblings are more likely to prefer redistribution. 
Further, the first-born person among siblings is less likely to prefer redistribution.  
 
The effect of experiencing competition can be considered differently according to 
the standpoint of individuals. Assuming that those who experience competition 
become rich, they prefer income redistribution only when they are altruistic. On 
the other hand, assuming that those who experience competition become poor, they 
prefer income redistribution, even though they are selfish. If the number of elder 
siblings is associated with individuals preferring income redistribution, they can 
be considered selfish. If the number of younger siblings causes individuals to prefer 
income redistribution, they can be considered as altruistic. Furthermore, the sex of 
siblings appears to be an important factor determining economic outcomes (Garg 
and Morduch 1998; Dayiogru et al. 2009). To more closely examine the effect of 
experiencing competition in the family, siblings need to be divided into elder and 
younger siblings and then this effect can be examined. Generally, parents are 
thought to prefer sons than daughters, and therefore, the role played by sisters 
appears to be different from the role played by brothers (Garg and Morduch 1998). 
For example, elder sisters tend to work to earn money for investing for younger 
brothers (Edmond 2006). Therefore, it is important to investigate how and the 
extent to which the presence of elder (or younger) brothers is different from that of 
elder (or younger) sisters. 
 
3. Data and Methods 
 
3.1. Data 
JGSS data were used in the current study. The data were individual-level data.8 
                                                   
8Data for this secondary analysis, "Japanese General Social Survey (JGSS), Ichiro 
Tanioka," was provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Information Center 
for Social Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social Science, The University of 
Tokyo. 
  
A two-stage stratified sampling method was used for JGSS surveys. The surveys 
were conducted throughout Japan from 2000. The JGSS dataset used in this study 
covered 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, and 2008. 9  The JGSS was 
purposefully designed as a Japanese counterpart to the GSS from the United 
States. The JGSS asks various questions concerning an individual’s characteristics 
by face-to-face interviews. Therefore, the data contain information related to 
preferences regarding income redistribution policies, family structure (number of 
siblings, individual’s birth order, and number of children), marital and 
demographic (age and sex) status, annual household income10, years of schooling, 
size of residential area, age, prefecture of residence, and prefecture of residence at 
15 years old. A Japanese prefecture is considered to be the equivalent to a state in 
the United States or a province in Canada. There are 47 prefectures in Japan. 
Each prefecture contains cities, towns and villages. In the JGSS, sizes of 
residential areas are categorized as follows: large cities, small cities, and towns (or 
villages). 
Table 1 shows construction of the research sample. Data were collected from 
22,793 adults, between 20 and 89 years old. Respondents did not answer all of the 
survey questions. Inevitably, data concerning some variables used in the 
estimation in this study were not available. Therefore, the number of samples used 
in the regression estimations was reduced, ranging between 10,497 to 11,136.  
The use of JGSS data has certain advantages for empirical analysis. This study 
aimed to re-examine the evidence provided by Fehr et al (2008). Data used by Fehr 
et al (2008) were constructed by experiments on Swiss children. The JGSS provides 
detailed information regarding family structure and family members and 
individual’s preferences. Furthermore, various variables, such as residential place 
and economic conditions during the childhood are available from JGSS. The JGSS 
enables attenuation of omitted variable bias. Therefore, the JGSS is useful for 
determining the effect of a family member on the formation of an individual’s 
preference by controlling for various characteristics (Kawaguchi and Miyazaki 
2009). In addition, evidence of the experimental analysis was based on a small 
                                                   
9Surveys were not conducted in 2004 and 2007. Surveys were conducted in 2009 and 
2010, but the data could not be obtained.  
10In the original dataset, annual earnings were grouped into 19 categories, and we 
assumed that everyone in each category earned the midpoint value. For the top 
category of “23 million yen and above,” it was assumed that everybody earned 23 
million yen. Among observations used in the regression estimations, slightly less than 
1% of observations occurred in this category. Therefore, the problem of top-coding 
should not be an issue. 
  
sample (127 girls and 102 boys), although various biases can be controlled (Fehr et 
al., 2004). As explained earlier, the sample size of this study was far greater than it. 
Therefore, results based on JGSS data are able to provide more general evidence 
than experimental analyses.  
The definitions and basic statistics of variables used in the regression 
estimations are shown in Table 2. EQUALITY, the key dependent variable, was 
used as a proxy for preferences for income redistribution. In the JGSS, a question 
regarding income redistribution asks “What is your opinion of the following 
statement?”: “It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in 
income between families with high incomes and those with low incomes.” There are 
five response options, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
EQUALITY is the value that the respondents chose. In addition, respondents were 
asked the question: “If you consider when you were approximately 15 years old, 
what would you say about your family income compared with Japanese families in 
general?” There were five response options, ranging from 1 (far below average) to 5 
(far above average). CONDITION 15 is the value that the respondents chose. 
SIBLINGS represents the number of respondent’s siblings. The sample 
included an “only child” who does not have siblings at all. Therefore, the minimum 
value of SIBLINGS is 0. FIRST represents the first sibling dummy, which is 1 if 
the respondent was the first child, otherwise it is 0. “Only child” was regarded as 
FIRST. Respondents were more likely to be FIRST when the number of siblings 
was smaller. The effect of family size should be controlled. All of the estimation 
results reported in this study did not exclude “only child”. However, excluding 
“only child” from the sample does not change the estimation results, although 
these results have not been reported11. 
Figure 1 illustrates the relation between EQUALITY and SIBLINGS (number 
of siblings). In Figure 1, there are 47 points demonstrating mean values of 
EQUALITY and SIBLINGS within a prefecture. EQUALITY was positively 
associated with SIBLINGS, implying that people with a larger number of siblings 
are more inclined to prefer redistributive policy (Figure 1). This is in line with 
Hypothesis 2. 
Table 3 provides mean comparisons of variables including subjective values and 
economic conditions between the first sibling and other siblings. With the 
exception of UNEMPLOYED, there were statistically significant differences 
between all the variables. EQUALITY of the first child was 3.68, which is 0.08 
                                                   
11 The results are available from the author upon request. 
  
points larger on the five-point scale compared with the other siblings. In addition, 
this difference was statistically significant at the 1% level. This is consistent with 
Hypothesis 2, rather than Hypothesis 1. SCHOOLING of the first child was 12.4, 
whereas that of the other siblings was 11.6. This difference was statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This is in line with the assertion that children born 
later in the family are thought to obtain less education (Black et al., 2005; 
Kantarevic and Mechoulan 2006). If human capital of the first sibling is larger 
than that of the other younger siblings, the income level of the first sibling is 
higher than that in the younger ones (Black et al., 2005; Kantarevic and 
Mechoulan 2006). Congruent to this inference, INCOME of the first child was 634, 
while that of the others was 572. Parents are more inclined to invest for the first 
child than others. The larger the parents’ investment for education is, the richer 
children perceive their household to be. In other words, the attitude of parents 
regarding investment for education appears to influence their children’s subjective 
evaluation about the economic condition of their household during their school 
years. CONDITION 15 of the first child was 2.73, which is 0.08 higher on the 
five-point scale compared with the other siblings. Families with a higher income 
have fewer children (Becker and Lewis 1973; Becker and Tomes 1976). Further, the 
first-born reflects not only the effect of birth order but also the probability of 
coming from a small family (Hanushek 1992; Kantarevic and Mechoulan 2006). A 
decrease in this effect is suggested from the results when those without siblings 
were excluded from the sample (Table 3). However, the results did not change. 
Results of CONDITION 15 are consistent with the inference above. The results 
shown in Table 3 suggest that the first child is more likely to be in better condition 
than the others, whereas the first child is less likely to prefer redistributive policy 
than the others. These results indicate that the economic advantage of the first 
sibling among all siblings does not cause the first sibling to be generous and 
altruistic. 
The combined results of Table 3 and Figure 1 are consistent with Hypothesis 2, 
rather than Hypothesis 1. However, various factors were not controlled in these 
results. For closer examination of Hypothesis1 and Hypothesis 2, regression 
estimations were conducted and are shown in the following sections. 
 
3.2. Econometric Framework and Estimation Strategy 
 
For the purpose of examining the previously proposed hypotheses, the 
  
estimated function of the baseline model is as follows: 
 
EQUAL i= 1 SIBLINGS i+ 2FIRST BOY i +3FIRST GIRL i + 4CONDIITON 15i 
+ 5INCOMEi + 6AGEi + 7MARRIEDi + 8SCHOOLINGi+ 
9UNEMPLOYEDi+ 10MALEi + ui, 
where EQUALi represents the dependent variable in individual i. Regression 
parameters are represented by . As explained earlier, values for EQUAL range 
from 1 to 5, which can be regarded as an ordered response. In this case, the ordered 
probit model is applicable, and therefore, was used to conduct the estimations 
(Greene 1997). The error term is represented by ui. During the studied period of 
2000-2008, macro-economic conditions in Japan were thought to face various 
exogenous shocks. Macro-economic shocks appear to affect an individual’s 
perception. Therefore, for including macro-economic shocks, this study included 
year dummies. In addition, characteristics of residential areas also appear to affect 
an individual’s perception. Dummies of current residential prefectures were 
incorporated to control for economic conditions of residential places. Further, the 
degree of urbanization is thought to influence the perception. Dummies of the size 
of areas were included to include this effect. 
It is reasonable to assume that observations may be spatially correlated within 
an area. This is because the preference of one agent may be well related to the 
preference of another in the same area. In this study, as explained earlier, 
concerning information of area, the prefecture where respondents reside is 
available. To consider such a spatial correlation in line with this assumption, the 
Stata cluster command was used and z-statistics were calculated using robust 
standard errors. The advantage of this approach is that the magnitude of spatial 
correlation can be unique to each prefecture.  
The most important variable to determine the effect of family structure, 
SIBLINGS, which represents the number of siblings, was included to examine the 
degree of competition among siblings. The question can be asked: “Does the 
respondent’s preference for redistribution depend on whether the respondent is a 
first-born child?” To examine this question, FIRST was included. The first-born 
capture not only the birth order effect but also the probability of coming from a 
small family (Hanushek 1992; Kantarevic and Mechoulan 2006). Incorporating 
FIRST and SIBLINGS as independent variables indentifies the effect of the 
respondent’s birth order and number of siblings. The sex of the siblings is thought 
to be associated with outcomes because the role of daughters is different from the 
  
role of sons (Garg and Morduch 1998; Edmond 2006). Therefore, in an alternative 
model, the first-born child was divided into son (FIRST BOY) and daughter (FIRST 
GIRL). FIRST BOY and FIRST GIRL are considered to reflect the effects of birth 
order as well as sex of the first-born child. Further, those with a larger number of 
siblings are likely to earn less (Kantarvic and Mechoulan 2006; Björklund et al., 
2006). The first-born child is more likely to have investment for education than the 
other children by parents, and therefore, earnings eventually increase and the 
probability of unemployment decreases (Black et al. 2005; Kantrevic and 
Mechoulan, 2006; Lampi and Nordblom 2012). This might affect the preferences 
for redistribution, rather than rivalry and competition among siblings. Therefore, 
to control for the effect of investment for human capital by parents, SCHOOLING, 
INCOME and UNEMPLOYED were included as independent variables.  
This study examined whether circumstances when an individual grows up are 
associated with the formation of preferences. The economic condition at 15 years 
old is thought to be one of the facets of these circumstances. Richer parents may 
have fewer children and choose to increase the average quality of children (Becker 
1960; Becker and Lewis 1973; Becker and Tomes 1976). Children from richer 
families may consider goods less valuable (Fehr et al., 2008, 19 in supplementary 
information). Therefore, the number of siblings might represent the economic 
condition. To control for this possibility and directly examine the effect of siblings 
and birth order, CONDITION 15 was incorporated as a dependent variable. If 
people who grow up in richer conditions are more likely to be generous and 
altruistic, the coefficient of CONDITION 15 is a positive sign. Furthermore, 
dummies of the residential prefecture at 15 years old were incorporated to allow 
for economic conditions of residential areas during childhood. Controlling for 
economic conditions at 15 years old enables examination of the long-term effect of 
competition among siblings during childhood on formation of preference.  
Existing literature ascertaining the determinants of preference for 
redistribution (e.g., Ravallian and Lokshin, 2000; Corneo and and Gruüner, 2002; 
Ohtake and Tomioka 2004; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Rainer and Seidler, 2008; 
Alesina and Giuliano 2009), in addition to the economic factors age, marry, and 
male, were included as independent variables to control for individual 
characteristics.  
In the baseline model, the effect of respondent’s birth order was focused on. 
Therefore, the feature of a respondent’s siblings was not considered. To examine the 
effect of the feature of a respondent’s siblings, the alternative model is as follows: 
  
 
EQUAL I= 1 ELDER BROTHERS i+2 ELDER SISTERS i+ 3 YOUNGER 
BROTHERS i+4 YOUGNER SISTERS i + 5CONDIITON 15i + 6INCOMEi + 
7AGEi + 8MARRIEDi + 9SCHOOLINGi + 10UNEMPLOYEDi + 11MALEi + 
ui. 
 
Instead of FIRST BOY and FIRST GIRL, key independent variables were ELDER 
BROTHERS (number of brothers older than the respondent), ELDER SISTERS 
(number of sisters older than the respondent), YOUNGER BROTHERS (number of 
brothers younger than the respondent), and YOUNGER SISTERS (number of 
sisters younger than the respondent). Apart from these key variables, other control 
variables were the same as those included in the baseline model. If the presence of 
elder siblings leads people to prefer redistribution, coefficients of ELDER 
BROTHERS and ELDER SISTERS have positive signs. If the presence of younger 
siblings leads people to oppose redistribution, coefficients of YOUNGER 
BROTHERS and YOUNGER SISTERS have negative signs. Furthermore, when 
the effect of siblings differs between siblings’ sex, the results of ELDER 
(YOUNGER) BROTHERS are different from those of ELDER (YOUNGER) 
SISTERS. In addition, the sample was divided into a male sample and female 
sample to examine how sex differences between siblings and respondents affect the 
formation of redistribution preference.  
 
4. Estimation Results 
 
The estimation results of the ordered probit model are presented in Tables 4-6, 
7 (1), (2), (3), and 8 (1), (2), (3). The results of the baseline model are reported in 
Table 4 where the key variable is SIBLINGS. In Table 5, SIBLINGS and FIRST 
are included at the same time. Further, to examine the differences in sex regarding 
the first-born child, SIBLINGS, FIRST BOY, and FIRST GIRL are included in 
Table 6. To examine the composition of siblings in more detail, the effect of the 
number of elder siblings and younger siblings was examined (Tables 7-8). 
Furthermore, to examine how of the effect of the composition of siblings differs 
according to the respondent’s sex, the sample was divided into a male respondent 
sample and a female respondents’ sample. Therefore, Table 7 (1), (2) and (3) shows 
the results of all samples, the male sample, and the female sample, respectively. In 
Table 7 (1), (2) and (3), ELDER SIBLINGS and YOUNGER SIBLINGS are used. 
  
Further, for closer examination, Table 8 (1), (2) and (3) incorporate ELDER 
BROTHERS, ELDER SISTERS, YOUNGER BROTHERS, and YOUNGER 
SISTERS as key independent variables.  
Various control variables reported in Table 4 are not shown in other tables 
(Table 5-8). However, control variables included in each column of Table 4 are also 
included in corresponding columns of other tables. For example, control variables 
included in the estimation of column (2) of Table 4 are also incorporated in column 
(2) of other tables when estimations were conducted. In each table, the estimation 
results, including CONDITION 15 and dummies of residential prefecture at 15 
years old, are reported in columns (1)-(3), whereas the results excluding them are 
reported in columns(4)-(6).  
In Table 4, in all columns, the coefficient of SIBLINGS had a positive sign and 
was statistically significant. This indicates that the larger the number of siblings, 
the more an individual is likely to prefer redistribution policy. The result that 
SIBLINGS does not change according to various specifications, supports 
Hypothesis 2, rather than Hypothesis 1. With regard to economic conditions during 
childhood, the sign of CONDITION 15 was negative and statistically significant at 
the 1% level as shown in columns (1)-(3). This suggests that people who grow up in 
richer condition are more likely to be selfish, rather than altruistic. Concerning 
control variables, the sign for INCOME was negative and statistically significant 
at the 1% level in all estimations. This indicates that a reduction in income via the 
policy of income redistribution leads rich people to oppose such a policy. Significant 
negative values for SCHOOLING were observed in all estimations. This finding 
suggests that people with a higher education are more likely to expect higher 
future earnings, therefore opposing redistribution policy, even if the current 
income is controlled. The coefficient of UNEMPLOYED had a positive sign in all 
estimations and was statistically significant as shown in columns (1)-(6). This 
implies that a difficult economic situation leads unemployed people to prefer 
redistribution policy to improve their situation. The results of control variables 
shown in Tables 5-8 were almost the same as those shown in Table 4. Therefore, in 
Tables 5-8, they were not reported and the key variables were focused on instead12. 
When SIBLINGS as well as FIRST were included, the sign of SIBLINGS was 
positive in all columns; however, it was statistically significant only in columns (3) 
and (6) of Table 5. On the other hand, FIRST yielded a negative sign in all columns. 
However, FIRST was not statistically significant in all columns. Table 6 indicates 
                                                   
12 The results are available from the author upon request. 
  
that FIRST BOY had a negative sign and it was statistically significant in columns 
(1)-(6). On the other hand, FIRST GIRL had a negative sign as shown in columns 
(1) and (4) and a positive sign in columns (2), (3), (5) and (6). In addition, FIRST 
GIRL was not statistically significant in all columns. It is interesting that the 
first-born effect was significant only for males, but not for females. The results of 
SIBLINGS shown in Table 6 are almost the same as those in Table 5. The results 
shown in Tables 5 and 6 suggest that the fist-born male is more inclined to oppose 
redistribution policy than other siblings; however, such an inclination was not 
observed for the first-born female. The first-born male is considered as selfish, 
whereas the first-born female is neither selfish nor altruistic.  
The effect of the composition of siblings was then examined in more detail. 
Table 7 (1) shows that a significant positive sign of ELDER SIBLINGS was 
observed (all columns). On the other hand, YOUNGER SIBLINGS had a positive 
sign, but this was not statistically significant in all columns. This implies that the 
larger the number of elder siblings is, the more an individual is likely to prefer 
redistribution policy. The number of younger siblings, however, had no effect on the 
individual’s preference for redistribution. The results of Table 7 (1) were similar to 
those of Table 7 (2) based on the sample being restricted to male respondents. With 
regard to female respondents, as shown in Table7 (3), with the exception of ELDER 
SIBLINGS in column 6, the coefficients of ELDER SIBLINGS and YOUNGER 
SIBLINGS were not statistically significant. This finding suggests that the 
number of elder siblings and younger siblings are not associated with a female’s 
preference for redistribution.  
The number of elder siblings was divided into the number of elder brothers and 
number of elder sisters, and the number of younger siblings was divided into the 
number of younger brothers and number of younger sisters. As shown in Table 8 (1), 
coefficients for both ELDER BROTHERS and ELDER SISTERS had a positive 
sign in all columns. Interestingly, in all columns, ELDER BROTHERS was 
statistically significant at the 1% level while ELDER SISTERS was not 
statistically significant. With regard to the results of younger siblings, coefficients 
for YOUNGER BROTHERS had a positive sign and YOUNGER SISTERS had a 
negative sign in all columns. However, YOUNGER BROTHERS and YOUNGER 
SISTERS were not statistically significant in columns (1)-(6). This indicates that 
the number of elder brother plays an important role in forming an individual’s 
preference for redistribution, whereas the number of elder sisters does not play a 
role. It is speculated that elder brothers can take advantage of their superior age 
  
over younger siblings. Elder brothers are selfish, and therefore, exploit their senior 
age to their own advantage. Younger siblings inevitably obtain a smaller allocation 
than elder brothers. “Poorer” young siblings are also selfish and, therefore, aim to 
increase their allocation through redistribution. This is in line with the results of 
Table 7 (1)-(3). In the case of elder sisters, as pointed out by Garg and Morduch 
(1998), elder sisters are unlikely to be selfish and, therefore, do not exploit senior 
age to their own advantage. With regard to younger siblings, the number of 
younger brothers and number of younger sisters do not affect preference.  
With regard to the sample being restricted to male respondents, Table 8 (2) 
shows that coefficients for both ELDER BROTHERS and ELDER SISTERS had a 
positive sign in all columns. Further, ELDER BROTHERS was statistically 
significant at the 1% level in all columns, while ELDER SISTERS was statistically 
significant only in columns (3) and (6). Therefore, the results of ELDER 
BROTHERS did not change according to specifications, and therefore, can be 
considered as robust. On the other hand, the results of ELDER SISTERS changed 
according to specifications and, therefore, cannot be considered as robust. 
YOUNGER BROTHERS and YOUNGER SISTERS were not statistically 
significant in columns (1)-(6). Therefore, overall, the results of Table 8 (2) were 
similar to those of Table 8 (1).  
With regard to the results based on the sample being restricted to female 
respondents, as shown in all columns of Table 8 (3), the sign of the coefficient of 
ELDER BROTHER was positive, while that of ELDER SISTERS was negative. 
Furthermore, in all columns, ELDER BROTHER was statistically significant, 
whereas ELDER SISTERS was not significant. Therefore, in all columns of Table 8 
(1)-(3), a significant positive sign was observed only for ELDER BROTHER. 
Further, the value of the coefficient of ELDER BROTHER was 0.02 for the male 
sample (Table 8 (2)) and it was 0.04 for the female sample (Table 8 (3)). This 
suggests that the effect of the number of elder brothers on agreeing on 
redistribution policy for females was 0.02 higher on the five-point scale than for 
males13. With regard to the number of younger siblings, it is surprising that the 
                                                   
13 Marginal effects should be reported and considered when results of an ordered 
probit estimation are more precisely interpreted. “The marginal effects of the 
regressors on the probability are not equal to the coefficients” (Greene 1997, p. 927). 
Therefore, difficulty is encountered in the interpretation of coefficients. Instead of 
coefficients, the marginal effects can be calculated in each dependent variable category 
(Greene 1997, p. 927–931). However, results of marginal effects were similar to results 
of coefficients in the current study. Therefore, marginal effects were not reported in 
this study. The results of marginal effects are available upon request from the author. 
  
coefficient for YOUNG SISTERS had a negative sign and was statistically 
significant in all columns. In contrast, the coefficient of YOUNGER BROTHERS 
had a positive sign in all columns and was statistically significant in columns (4) 
and (6). This negative effect of YOUNGER SISTERS did not change according to 
various specifications, and therefore, the results of YOUNGER SISTERS can be 
considered as robust. The positive effect of YOUNGER BROTHERS was not 
significant in some specifications; therefore, the results of YOUNGER BROTHERS 
cannot be considered as robust. Overall, a female’s preference for redistribution 
was affected not only by the existence of elder brothers but also by that of younger 
sisters. Furthermore, elder brothers resulted in females preferring redistribution. 
In contrast, younger sisters resulted in females not prefer redistribution. The effect 
of elder brothers can be interpreted in the same way as shown in Table 8 (1). These 
results of YOUNGER SISTERS suggest that younger sisters become rivals to 
females because they are the same sex. Females take advantage of senior age and, 
therefore, can obtain a larger allocation than younger sisters. Therefore, the 
redistribution policy reduces female’s allocation. Consequently, females do not 
prefer redistribution policy. This implies that females are selfish towards younger 
sisters. In the case that females are selfish, the sign of the coefficient of ELDER 
SISTER is positive. However, the sign of ELDER SISTER becomes negative, 
despite being statistically insignificant. Further, if females are selfish, the sign of 
FIRST GIRL becomes negative (Table 6). However, Table 6 shows that the sign of 
FIRST GIRL varied and was not statistically significant. Therefore, findings 
regarding females are difficult to explain. However, solving this issue is beyond the 
scope of this study and will need to be analyzed in a future sturdy. 
Overall, it can be concluded that the estimation results examined in this section 
are consistent with Hypothesis 2, and support it reasonably well, but they are not 
consistent with Hypothesis 1. Furthermore, in summary, the various estimated 
results presented thus far suggest that males are consistently selfish, and 
therefore, birth order changes their preference for redistribution. However, it is 
unclear whether females are selfish, and therefore, the effect of birth order on 
preference is not conclusive. Such a difference between males and females can be 
explained, in part, by the fact that the expected role of sons is different from that of 
daughters within a family (Garg and Morduch 1998; Edmond 2006)). Similarly, as 
asserted in the “identity theory” (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000), the self-image of 
daughters is different from that of sons, leading to differences in preference. The 
evidence provided in this study is not consistent with Fehr et al. (2008). 
  
Accordingly, role and self-image appear to depend on the cultural and historical 
background of countries.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In the classical economics, an individual’s preference is exogenously given and 
is not analyzed. However, to develop a new field, modern economists have 
attempted to analyze how an individual’s preference is formed. The structure of 
families appears to play a critical role on the formation of an individual’s 
preference during childhood. The seminal work of Fehr et al (2008) involved an 
experiment on Swiss children and they found that children without siblings are 
more likely to share resources voluntary and the youngest child is less likely to 
share them. Formation of preference possibly depends on the cultural and social 
background of a country where people grow up (Alesina et al., 2004). However, 
apart from the study by Fehr et al (2008), little is known regarding the effect of 
siblings and birth order on redistribution preference. 
Therefore, based on individual data of the JGSS, the current study examined 
how the number of siblings and birth order are associated with the preference for 
redistribution in an attempt to test a hypothesis derived from the result of Fehr et 
al. (2008). After controlling for various individual characteristics, ordered probit 
estimations showed the following. (1) The first-born son is less likely to prefer 
income redistribution; however, such a tendency is not observed for the first-born 
daughter. (2) The number of younger siblings does not affect an individual’s 
preference for redistribution. (3) The larger the number of elder brothers is, the 
more an individual is likely to prefer income redistribution. However, the number 
of elder sisters does not affect the preference. These findings are not in agreement 
with the evidence in a European country provided by Fehr et al (2008). Further, 
when the sex difference is more closely examined, the following was found. (1) The 
larger the number of elder brothers is, the more an individual is likely to prefer 
income redistribution; however, the number of elder sisters does not affect the 
preference. (2) The number of younger siblings does not affect a male’s preference 
for redistribution regardless of the sibling’s sex. The number of younger brothers 
does not affect a female’s preference, whereas the number of younger sisters leads 
females to prefer income redistribution. 
One of the reasons for the difference between findings of this study and that of 
Fehr et al. (2008) might be, at least in part, due to methodological differences. The 
  
current study used survey data, whereas Fehr et al. (2008) used data gathered 
from experiments. Apart from the difference in methodology, the cultural and 
social background were also different between studies, which caused a difference 
in value and, therefore, economic preference (e.g., Chang 2010; Eugster et al., 
2011; Fehr and Hoff 2011; Luttmer. 2011). It is considered that the society of Japan 
is more harmonious than that in Western countries, and this plays an important 
role in forming the features of institutions in Japan (Kawashima, 1963). Because of 
this assertion, Japanese people are thought to be more inclined to cooperate and 
avoid conflict. However, in contrast, Yamagishi (1988a, 1988b) suggested that 
Japanese people are more selfish than Americans. In line with this consideration, 
the findings of the current study suggest that preference for income redistribution 
can be explained by the standard economic theory, which assumes that individuals 
aim only to increase their own benefit. Taken together, the findings from this study 
and those by Fehr et al. (2008) suggest that Japanese people can be characterized 
as selfish, whereas Swiss people can be characterized as altruistic. This argument 
is congruent to the assertion, which was based on experimental analysis to control 
for other factors, that social identity affects fundamental economic preferences 
(Benjamin et al., 2010; Klor and Shayo, 2010).  
Because of the limitation of the survey data, estimation results of the current 
study appeared to suffer from various biases. Furthermore, the conditions of the 
present study and those in the study by Fehr et al. (2008) are different. Fehr et al. 
(2008) used children between 3-8 years old as subjects of the experiment to 
determine the process of formation of preference. On the other hand, respondents 
of JGSS data are between 20-89 years old. Therefore, the current study shed light 
on the preference regarded as the outcome of family structure, rather than the 
process of preference formation. For more detailed examination on comparing the 
preference of Japanese and European people, precisely planned experiments need 
to be conducted to control for various biases. 
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Figure 1.  
Relationship between the number of siblings and preference for income distribution. 
Mean values in the prefecture are used. 
 
 
 
 
  
     Table 1. Construction of the research sample 
  Year Observations from 
the original sample 
Observations used in 
the analysis  
2000 
2,893 1,911 
2001 
2,790 1,762 
2002 
2,953 1,913 
2005 
2,023 1,051 
2006 
4,254 1,252 
2008 
4,220 2,608 
Total 
27,793 10,497 
Observations were used in the analysis when all variables were available for the estimations. The number of siblings was not possible to 
obtain in 2003. Therefore, the sample of 2003 was not used in this study. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
     Table 2 
Basic statistics and definition of variables used for estimations. 
 Definitions Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
EQUALITY Degree of agreement with the argument that the government 
should reduce income inequality: 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree) 
3.77 1.03 1 5 
FIRST  It is 1 if the respondent is the first-born child; otherwise it is 0. 0.74 ---- 0 1 
FIRST BOY It is 1 if the respondent is male and the first-born child; otherwise 
it is 0. 
   0.36 ---- 0 1 
FIRST GIRL It is 1 if the respondent is female and the first-born child; 
otherwise it is 0. 
   0.38 ---- 0 1 
SIBLINGS Number of siblings 2.74 2.01 0 15 
ELDER 
SIBLINGS 
Number of siblings older than the respondent 1.48 1.68 0 13 
YOUNGER 
SIBLINGS 
Number of siblings younger than the respondent 1.25 1.40 0 11 
ELDER 
BROTHERS 
Number of brothers older than the respondent 0.72 1.02 0 10 
ELDER 
SISTERS 
Number of sisters older than the respondent 0.75 1.06 0 9 
YOUNGER 
BROTHERS 
Number of brothers younger than the respondent 0.64 0.91 0 9 
YOUNGER  
SISTERS 
Number of sisters younger than the respondent. 0.61 0.90 0 9 
  
CONDITION15 Question: “Considering when you were approximately 15 years 
old, what would you say regarding your family income compared 
with Japanese families in general?” 
1 (well below average) to 5 (well above average) 
2.70 0.93 1 5 
INCOME Individual household income 
(million yen) 
629 421 0 2300 
AGE Age (years) 53.3 15.2 20 89 
MARRIED It is 1 if the respondent is currently married; otherwise it is 0. 0.82 0.37 0 1 
SCHOOLING 
 
Years of schooling 12.2 2.5 6 18 
UNEMPLOYED It is 1 if the respondent is currently unemployed; otherwise it is 0. 0.01 0.11 0 1 
MALE It is 1 if the respondent is male, otherwise it is 0. 0.49 0.49 0 1 
The total number of observations was 10,550. In this sample, all variables used in this study were obtained.  
  
Table 3 
Mean values for the first sibling and other siblings  
 
 First siblings Others t-statistics 
EQUALITY 3.68 3.76 -4.80*** 
CONDITION15 2.73 2.65 6.24*** 
CONDITION15 
(excluding those who do 
not have siblings) 
      2.73       2.65  6.36*** 
INCOME 
 
634 572  8.91*** 
SCHOOLING 
 
12.4 11.6  23.0*** 
UNEMPLOYED 
 
0.01 0.01 1.04 
All observations were used. Absolute values of t-statistics are the results of a mean 
difference test between high- and low-income household groups. ***indicates 
significance at the 1% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4 Baseline model where the dependent variable is Equality (ordered probit model)  
 (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)   (6) 
SIBLINGS 
 
0.01** 
(2.06) 
0.01** 
(2.17) 
0.01*** 
(2.77) 
 0.01** 
(2.34) 
0.01** 
(2.41) 
0.01*** 
(3.17) 
CONDITION15   -0.06*** 
(-5.42) 
  -0.06*** 
(-5.70) 
  -0.07*** 
(-6.60) 
    
INCOME  -0.31*103*** 
  (-9.81) 
 -0.29*103*** 
  (-9.31) 
 -0.32*103*** 
  (-11.4) 
  -0.30*103*** 
  (-9.58) 
 -0.29*103*** 
  (-9.02) 
 -0.33*103*** 
  (-11.5) 
AGE    0.003*** 
   (3.66) 
   0.003*** 
   (4.64) 
   0.004*** 
   (5.68) 
    0.003*** 
   (4.16) 
   0.003*** 
   (5.44) 
   0.005*** 
   (6.80) 
MARRIED    0.01 
   (0.71) 
   
 
     0.03 
   (1.56) 
   
 
 
SCHOOLING    -0.02*** 
   (-4.80) 
   -0.02*** 
   (-4.32) 
    
 
    -0.02*** 
   (-5.64) 
   -0.02*** 
   (-5.09) 
    
 
UNEMPLOYED     0.26** 
   (2.29) 
    0.20** 
   (2.04) 
    0.21** 
   (2.24) 
     0.24** 
   (2.14) 
    0.19** 
   (1.97) 
    0.21* 
   (2.20) 
MALE      0.06*** 
   (2.80) 
     0.05** 
   (2.48) 
     0.04* 
   (1.86) 
      0.07*** 
   (2.88) 
     0.06*** 
   (2.60) 
     0.04** 
   (1.99) 
Prefecture at 15 years old 
dummies 
  Yes Yes Yes  No No No 
Log pseudolikelihood -13901   -14754    -14810  -14184   -15039 -15116 
Observations   10497   11096 11136    10676   11281 11322 
Values are coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered in the prefecture. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. In all estimations, prefecture dummies, size of residential 
place dummies, and year dummies were included as independent variables, but were not reported because of space limitations. 
  
Table 5 Dependent variable is Equality (ordered probit model) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)   (6) 
SIBLINGS 
 
0.008 
(1.18) 
0.008 
(1.35) 
0.01** 
(2.04) 
 0.008 
(1.30) 
0.009 
(1.46) 
0.01** 
(2.32) 
FIRST  -0.04 
(-1.40) 
-0.04 
(-1.30) 
-0.04 
(-1.32) 
 -0.04 
(-1.48) 
-0.04 
(-1.41) 
-0.04 
(-1.43) 
Prefecture at 15 years old 
dummies 
  Yes Yes Yes  No No No 
Log pseudolikelihood -13900   -14744    -14809  -14183   -15038 -15114 
Observations   10497   11096 11136    10676   11281 11322 
 
Values are coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered in the prefecture. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Each column includes a set of independent variables, which 
are the same as those of the corresponding column of Table 4. Further, in all estimations, prefecture dummies, size of residential place 
dummies, and year dummies were included as independent variables. These independent variables were not reported because of space 
limitations. 
  
Table 6 Dependent variable is Equality (ordered probit model) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)   (6) 
SIBLINGS 
 
0.008 
(1.17) 
0.008 
(1.34) 
0.01** 
(2.02) 
 0.008 
(1.30) 
0.009 
(1.46) 
0.01** 
(2.31) 
FIRST BOY -0.08*** 
(-2.61) 
-0.08** 
(-2.47) 
-0.08** 
(-2.52) 
 -0.08*** 
(-2.72) 
-0.08*** 
(-2.70) 
-0.09*** 
(-2.75) 
FIRST GIRL -0.003 
(-0.07) 
0.001 
(0.04) 
0.002 
(0.07) 
 -0.0005 
(-0.01) 
0.004 
(0.12) 
0.004 
(0.12) 
Prefecture at 15 years old 
dummies 
  Yes Yes Yes  No No No 
Log pseudolikelihood -13899   -14743    -14807  -14181   -15035 -15112 
Observations   10497   11096 11136    10676   11281 11322 
 
Values are coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered in the prefecture. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Each column includes a set of independent variables, which 
are the same as those of the corresponding column of Table 4. Further, in all estimations, prefecture dummies, size of residential place 
dummies, and year dummies were included as independent variables. These independent variables were not reported because of space 
limitations. 
  
Table 7 (1) Dependent variable is Equality (ordered probit model) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)   (6) 
ELDER SIBLINGS 0.01** 
(2.41) 
0.01** 
(2.44) 
0.02*** 
(2.83) 
 0.01*** 
(2.63) 
0.01*** 
(2.61) 
0.02*** 
(3.13) 
YOUNGER SIBLINGS 0.003 
(0.40) 
0.004 
(0.47) 
0.008 
(0.95) 
 0.005 
(0.61) 
0.005 
(0.64) 
0.009 
(1.22) 
Prefecture at 15 years old 
dummies 
  Yes Yes Yes  No No No 
Log pseudolikelihood -13900   -14744    -14808  -14183   -15038 -15114 
Observations   10497   11096 11136    10676   11281 11322 
 
Values are coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered in the prefecture. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Each column includes a set of independent variables, which are 
the same as those of the corresponding column of Table 4. Further, in all estimations, prefecture dummies, size of residential place 
dummies, and year dummies were included as independent variables. These independent variables were not reported because of space 
limitations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 7 (2) Dependent variable is Equality : male sample (ordered probit model) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)   (6) 
ELDER SIBLINGS 0.02** 
(2.33) 
0.02** 
(2.18) 
0.02*** 
(2.61) 
 0.02*** 
(2.75) 
0.02** 
(2.57) 
0.02*** 
(3.18) 
YOUNGER SIBLINGS 0.006 
(0.49) 
0.009 
(0.72) 
0.01 
(1.16) 
 0.007 
(0.57) 
0.009 
(0.74) 
0.01 
(1.29) 
Prefecture at 15 years old 
dummies 
  Yes Yes Yes  No No No 
Log pseudolikelihood -6966   -7480    -7516  -7135   -7652 -7693 
Observations   5152   5506 5524    5244   5601 5620 
 
Values are coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered in the prefecture. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Each column includes a set of independent variables which 
are the same as those of the corresponding column of Table 4. Further, in all estimations, prefecture dummies, size of residential place 
dummies, and year dummies were included as independent variables. These independent variables were not reported because of space 
limitations. 
  
Table 7 (3) Dependent variable is Equality : female sample (ordered probit model) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)   (6) 
ELDER SIBLINGS 0.01 
(1.39) 
0.01 
(1.39) 
0.01 
(1.58) 
 0.01 
(1.39) 
0.01 
(1.41) 
0.01* 
(1.67) 
YOUNGER SIBLINGS -0.005 
(-0.49) 
-0.007 
(-0.75) 
-0.004 
(-0.49) 
 -0.001 
(-0.17) 
-0.004 
(-0.48) 
-0.002 
(-0.25) 
Prefecture at 15 years old 
dummies 
  Yes Yes Yes  No No No 
Log pseudolikelihood -6810   -7135    -7164  -6944   -7273 -7309 
Observations   5345   5590 5611    5432   5680 5702 
 
Values are coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered in the prefecture. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Each column includes a set of independent variables, which 
are the same as those of the corresponding column of Table 4. Further, in all estimations, prefecture dummies, size of residential place 
dummies, and year dummies were included as independent variables. These independent variables were not reported because of space 
limitations. 
  
Table 8 (1) Dependent variable is Equality (ordered probit model) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)   (6) 
ELDER BROTHERS 0.03*** 
(2.84) 
0.03*** 
(3.04) 
0.03*** 
(3.31) 
 0.03*** 
(2.90) 
0.03*** 
(3.05) 
0.03*** 
(3.41) 
ELDER SISTERS 0.005 
(0.64) 
0.006 
(0.72) 
0.01 
(1.18) 
 0.006 
(0.74) 
0.006 
(0.80) 
0.01 
(1.38) 
YOUNGER BROTHERS 0.01 
(0.78) 
0.01 
(0.98) 
0.01 
(1.28) 
 0.01 
(1.14) 
0.01 
(1.30) 
0.02 
(1.61) 
YOUNGER SISTERS -0.004 
(-0.40) 
-0.005 
(-0.54) 
-0.001 
(-0.16) 
 -0.006 
(-0.62) 
-0.007 
(-0.79) 
-0.002 
(-0.27) 
Prefecture at 15 years old 
dummies 
  Yes Yes Yes  No No No 
Log pseudolikelihood -13898   -14742    -14807  -14181   -15035 -15112 
Observations   10497   11096 11136    10676   11281 11322 
 
Values are coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered in the prefecture. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Each column includes a set of independent variables, 
which are the same as those of the corresponding column of Table 4. Further, in all estimations, prefecture dummies, size of residential 
place dummies, and year dummies were included as independent variables. These independent variables were not reported because of 
space limitations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 8 (2) Dependent variable is Equality: male sample (ordered probit model) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)   (6) 
ELDER BROTHERS 0.02* 
(1.79) 
0.02* 
(1.70) 
0.02* 
(1.84) 
 0.02* 
(1.94) 
0.02* 
(1.87) 
0.03** 
(2.15) 
ELDER SISTERS 0.01 
(1.22) 
0.01 
(1.27) 
0.02* 
(1.79) 
 0.01 
(1.42) 
0.01 
(1.45) 
0.02* 
(2.07) 
YOUNGER BROTHERS -0.005 
(-0.29) 
0.002 
(0.02) 
0.004 
(0.28) 
 -0.001 
(-0.07) 
0.003 
(0.18) 
0.009 
(0.54) 
YOUNGER SISTERS 0.01 
(1.04) 
0.01 
(1.04) 
0.02 
(1.35) 
 0.01 
(0.97) 
0.01 
(0.91) 
0.02 
(1.29) 
Prefecture at 15 years old 
dummies 
  Yes Yes Yes  No No No 
Log pseudolikelihood -6965   -7480    -7516  -7134   -7652 -7693 
Observations   5152   5506 5524    5244   5601 5620 
 
Values are coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered in the prefecture. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Each column includes a set of independent variables, 
which are the same as those of the corresponding column of Table 4. Further, in all estimations, prefecture dummies, size of residential 
place dummies, and year dummies were included as independent variables. These independent variables were not reported because of 
space limitations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 8 (3) Dependent variable is Equality: female sample (ordered probit model) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)   (6) 
ELDER BROTHERS 0.04** 
(2.19) 
0.04** 
(2.31) 
0.04** 
(2.49) 
 0.04** 
(2.12) 
0.04** 
(2.22) 
0.04** 
(2.43) 
ELDER SISTERS -0.007 
(-0.69) 
-0.007 
(-0.65) 
-0.005 
(-0.47) 
 -0.008 
(-0.74) 
-0.007 
(-0.68) 
-0.004 
(-0.44) 
YOUNGER BROTHERS 0.02 
(1.55) 
0.02 
(1.37) 
0.02 
(1.56) 
 0.03* 
(1.79) 
0.03 
(1.60) 
0.03* 
(1.72) 
YOUNGER SISTERS -0.03** 
(-2.36) 
-0.03** 
(-2.41) 
-0.03** 
(-2.23) 
 -0.03** 
(-2.31) 
-0.03** 
(-2.39) 
-0.03** 
(-2.15) 
Prefecture at 15 years old 
dummies 
  Yes Yes Yes  No No No 
Log Pseudolikelihood -6804   -7130    -7159  -6938   -7268 -7303 
Observations   5345   5590 5611    5432   5680 5702 
 
Values are coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered in the prefecture. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Each column includes a set of independent variables, 
which are the same as those of the corresponding column of Table 4. Further, in all estimations, prefecture dummies, size of residential 
place dummies, and year dummies were included as independent variables. These independent variables were not reported because of 
space limitations.  
 
